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A COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP CONCERNING THE 
ADMISSION OF MIGRANTS 
James A.R. Nafziger* 
Scholarship on immigration law has often overlooked an interna-
tional legal framework. Consequently, immigration decisions sometimes 
ignore constraints of international custom. In concrete human terms, 
the end result is to make it difficult for a prospective migrant to con-
vince immigration authorities that, under normal circumstances, inter-
national law protects a freedom of movement which may entitle the 
petitioner to documented entry. 
The following essay will focus attention on American legal scholar-
ship concerning the admission of migrants. 1 This topic is instructive 
and practical because of its impact on both municipal and global law. 
An eminent international jurist observed that greater foresight by 
scholars twenty-five years ago could have averted many current prob-
lems of migration. 2 Today, these problems arise from such sources as 
the population explosion, periodic droughts, the pull factor of oppor-
tunities in advanced economies, and massive political unrest in the Horn 
of Africa, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and 
elsewhere. 3 Migrants are knocking at the gates of sovereignty, even 
crashing some of them down. Until recently, every fifth person in 
• Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. B.A., 1962, University of Wisconsin; 
J.D., 1967, Harvard University; M.A., 1969, University of Wisconsin. 
l. This Article will not focus on issues concerning the welfare of migrants either during or 
after their international movement. Thus, the issue of labor exploitation through illicit and 
clandestine trafficking, though it involves the movement and entry of laborers, lies beyond the 
scope of these comments. See Warzazi, Exploitation of Labour through Illicit and Clandestine 
Trafficking, United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights (Report of the Special Rapporteur), U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.640 (1975). Also, this Article will not specifically examine such related 
issues as emigration or voluntary return. See Ingles, Study of Discrimination in respect of the 
Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to His Own Coun-
try, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Com-
mission on Human Rights (Report of the Special Rapporteur), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev. 
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2. Ferguson, Introduction, Refugees: A New Dimension in International Human Rights, 10 
PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 58 (1976). 
3. See generally Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the Response 
of the International Community, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF REFUGEES 3, 12-21 (1982); Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. 
L. REv. 433, 436 (1983). 
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Somalia and every tenth person in Djibouti was a refugee. 4 Even under 
less extreme circumstances, migration provokes sensitive issues in the 
domestic politics of recipient countries. s International legal scholars 
need more than ever to respond creatively and systematically to the 
serious problems that result from the basic human need of migration. 
Unfortunately, American legal scholarship concerning the admission 
of migrants has two questionable tendencies. First, sorp.e writers assume 
that the state has a sovereign right to deny entry to any or all aliens. 
Second, there is a tendency to limit the status of "refugees" to victims 
of specific forms of governmental persecution. This Article explains 
these tendencies and suggests alternatives. Part I examines the interna-
tional legal framework within which American legal scholarship can 
be of some help. Part II explores the tendencies of American legal 
scholars to assume that states may deny admission to all aliens and 
to view narrowly the definition of refugees. Part III posits a tentative 
explanation for these tendencies. Part IV concludes that international 
legal scholars can and should have a more significant role in shaping 
immigration policy. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The General Admission of Aliens 
The general admission of all aliens - victims of natural disasters, 
persecution, serious breakdowns of public order and armed conflict; 
economic refugees; and persons simply in search of a better life -
is subject to international law. Even those writers who have ac-
knowledged broad sovereign competence to exclude aliens have also 
insisted upon a rightful exercise of that power, "tempered by the facts 
of modern civilization" and principles of international law and comity. 6 
For example, racial, geographical, and other forms of discrimination 
have long been regarded even by exclusionists as "tokens of arrogance."' 
A state has no "right" to exclude aliens unless, individually or col-
lectively, they pose a serious threat to the safety, security, welfare, 
or essential institutions of the state. 8 The exclusionary proposition that 
4. Nanda, World Refugee Assistance: The Role of International Law and Institutions, 9 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 449, 450 (1981) (citing reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees). 
5. Vincent, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 36 AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK, Dec. 1982, at I, 3. 
6. W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (8th ed. 1924). 
7. I C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED 
STATES 218 (2d rev. ed. 1951). 
8. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT, U.S. IM-
MIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 762 (1981) ("Any government [may exclude aliens] 
when entry would be likely to endanger the public health, welfare and safety or threaten national 
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a state has a right to exclude all aliens is questionable for several reasons. 
Writings used to support the proposition require legitimate reasons for 
exclusion in individual cases, such as necessity or self-preservation of 
a state. Also, states have customarily admitted aliens and have at times 
considered themselves bound to justify exclusion on grounds of public 
safety, security, welfare, or threat to essential institutions. 9 
Although some courts may have characterized the practice of ad-
mitting aliens as a voluntary waiver of the right to exclude or a self-
imposed limit on the exercise of the right, it is reasonable to regard 
state practice and the accompanying justification as recognition of a 
qualified duty to admit some aliens in normal circumstances. Moreover, 
commonly cited judicial opinions and related authority, at least in 
English language sources, are unconvincing; they often misinterpret 
other authority, contradict contemporaneous statements of opinio juris, 
and rest on questionable, often racist, presumptions. The international 
significance of migration and the interdependence of states lend sup-
port to the argument that the general admission of aliens should not 
be regarded as an untrammeled discretionary power within the exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction of states. 
Thus, although a state certainly has no duty to admit all aliens who 
might seek to enter its territory, it has a qualified duty to admit aliens 
when they pose no threat to the public safety, security, public welfare, 
or essential institutions of a recipient state. Admittedly, this formula-
tion is so broad as to permit expansive discretion by states, but affirm-
ing it encourages states, in their mutual interest, to develop more precise 
and humane rules, principles, and procedures to govern the general 
admission of aliens. 
security."); cf. id. at 723 (ambiguous criterion of undesirability in exclusionary statement). See 
. also J. BLUNTSCHLI, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE 228-29 (Se ed. revue et augmentee 1895) 
("L'exclusion de certains etrangers doit etre motivee par l'ordre, a surete ou le bien publics 
sinon elle serait en contradiction, avec le principe de la liberte des relations internationales. "); 
L. CAVARE, I LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PosITIF 275 n.88 (2d ed. 1961) ("[The state freedom 
to regulate the admission of aliens is a power] dont l'exercise peut etre critique par Jes organes 
internationaux.") (citing G. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS 80 (2d ed. 1932-1934)); E. 
BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 37 (1915) ("At the present day 
the right of admission and sojourn on the part of the unobjectionable aliens is almost universally 
recognized. Qualifications of the right, which are to be found in the possibilities of exclusion, 
expulsion and the fixing of conditions of sojourn by the state, must in practice be based upon 
reasonable grounds."); see also Hucker, Migration and Resettlement Under International Law, 
in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 327 (R. MacDonald, D. Johnston 
& G. Morris eds. 1978); D. O'CONNEL, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 695 (1970) ("Considering the 
universal restrictions placed on immigration in this century, and the almost total exclusion of 
aliens by some countries, it is surprising to discover that there is a widespread consensus of 
opinion, particularly on the Continent, favouring a general duty in international law to receive 
aliens."). 
9. For a more detailed development of these points, see Nafziger, The General Admission 
of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983). In addition to the qualified 
duty of states to admit some aliens, positive international law explicitly protects several rights 
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The moral duty of states to admit aliens under certain circumstances 
is even more specific. Short of massive programs for resettling 
unemployed workers and refugees, "it remains the duty of each coun-
try to open its own borders as widely as possible, without looking for 
excuses or waiting for others to act." 10 Specifically, "there is a moral 
duty of host states not simply to get rid of the foreign work force 
when a recession hits, nor to apply retroactive measures in order to 
thin its ranks." 11 
Within this legal and ethical framework, states are entitled to a wide 
margin of discretion in admitting aliens, but they should not close the 
door completely on grounds of sovereignty or a unilateral determina-
tion that immigration decisions lie wholly within domestic jurisdiction. 
Thus, a country such as Nigeria, in the throes of an economic crisis, 
may be entitled to expel large numbers of undocumented Ghanaian 
workers. A country such as Malaysia may be entitled to maintain its 
delicate balance between ethnic-racial groups through the use of rela-
tively strict immigration controls, in order to preserve its social order. 
A country such as Mexico, with massive unemployment and 
underemployment, need not bear the same burden of international 
responsibility to admit aliens from Guatemala as the United States. 
Countries such as Pakistan or Somalia, with populations already swollen 
by large numbers of refugees from neighboring countries, cannot be 
expected to accept still greater numbers. Ironically, in recent years several 
developing countries least able to absorb immigrants have borne the 
greatest alien burdens. 12 
B. The Admission of Refugees 
Refugees are persons who seek and urgently need foreign refuge, 
for whatever reason. One class of refugees is defined by treaty law. 
Under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, a "refugee" is any person who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his na-
tionality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
of migration. These include the right to leave and to return to one's country of origin or nationality, 
the right to family unity which entitles members of a family to rejoin another member 
already admitted into a foreign state, the right to be free from exclusion on racial grounds, 
and other entitlements under bilateral and multilateral conventions. G. GooDWIN-GILL, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 196-97 (1978). 
IO. S. HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 224-25 (1981). 
11. Id. at 225. 
12. Carlin, supra note 3, at 12-21; Fallows, Immigration: How it;s affecting us, 252 An. 
MONTHLY, Nov. 1983, at 45, 48. 
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avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 13 
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This definition is clearly inadequate as a comprehensive definition 
of refugees. The 1951 Convention was designed to respond to the post-
World War II crisis of displaced persons in Europe and not to arrest 
the development of a customary, more comprehensive regime of refugee 
law. Unfortunately, the Convention ignores economic refugees, vic-
tims of war, victims of natural disasters, and persons fearing persecu-
tion after a breakdown of public order in just one part of a single 
country. These latter categories of refugees would seem to be within 
the scope of the average person's definition of a refugee. By excluding 
them, however, the treaty definition has led governments to ignore the 
plight of many migrants or prospective migrants whom the layperson 
might expect to be treated as refugees. Moreover, a narrow definition 
of "refugee" makes it difficult to apply the legal consequences of that 
classification to specific cases where, for example, it is necessary to 
know something about socio-economic circumstances in order to 
evaluate a refugee's claim of governmental persecution. Finally, the 
1951 Convention does not address the issue of whether a state may re-
ject prospective refugees who apply for that status at the frontier, that 
is, upon entry into the country of refuge. That gap in the Convention 
is understandable because, in post-World War II Europe, most ap-
plicants for refugee status were already in foreign territory, after hav-
ing been displaced by the war and its aftermath. 
A more functional definition of "refugee," based on urgent human 
need, would include all migrants in critical need of refuge in a foreign 
state, regardless of their specific motivation for seeking refuge. For-
tunately, municipal and regional norms may, and occasionally do, ex-
pand the definition of a "refugee." Recently, for example, a federal 
court acknowledged the importance of economic and other factors in 
reviewing an administrative determination on the admissibility of de 
facto refugees already present in this country. In Haitian Refugee Center 
v. Smith, 14 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a petitioner 
13. ·convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. Parties to a 1967 Protocol have agreed to apply 
the Convention without limitation to "events occurring before I January 1951." Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 
6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as Protocol). Some writers have questioned whether 
there is any universally accepted definition of "refugee" under international law. A. GRAHL-
MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1966); Weis, The Concept of 
Refugee in International Law, U.N. Doc. HCR/INF. 49, at 32 (1960). 
14. 676 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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for asylum under the treaty definition should be allowed, as a matter 
of due process, to produce evidence of living conditions in the country 
of departure. These conditions might include ''the power structure, 
prisons, legal systems, politics, society, and economics." 1' 
C. Academic Neglect 
American scholarship concerning most topics of international law 
generally keeps ahead of official decisions. Leading writers have in-
fluenced municipal decision makers to adopt a broader vision of the 
national interest and have informed the process of codifying and pro-
gressively developing international law. 
It is puzzling, therefore, that American legal scholarship has lagged 
behind in the process of developing and implementing the international 
law of migrant movement and entry. Few American scholars have ad-
dressed fundamental problems of immigration in more general studies 
of international law. The "invisible college" of international lawyers 16 
has usually been just that - invisible - in the policy-planning pro-
cess. Too often, apocalyptic or panicky assumptions of economists and 
demographers have gone unchallenged. 
A good example of the invisibility of international lawyers in planning 
immigration law and policy is the highly publicized work of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The Select Commis-
sion was established in 1978 "to study and evaluate ... existing laws, 
policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and 
refugees to the United States and to make such administrative and 
legislative recommendations to the President and the Congress as are 
appropriate." 11 According to the Final Report of the Commission, 18 
although prominent immigration and labor specialists were involved, 
international legal scholars were not. Not one recognizable academic 
specialist in international law appears in the list of some fifty staff 
members, not one is listed among the fifty research grantees, and not 
one among hundreds of participants in formal 'consultations' initiated 
by the Commission. It should be no surprise, then, that the Final Report 
of the Commission overlooks international law in its discussion 
and recommendations pertaining to immigration policy and law. 
International lawyers are invisible not only in high-level policy plan-
ning, but also in the sessions of their own "invisible college." For 
example, not a single teacher-scholar of international law appeared 
as a speaker on either of two recent panels concerning undocumented 
15. Id. at 1042. 
16. Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 217 (1977). 
17. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 907, 908 (1978). 
18. JT. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Comm. Print 1981). 
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aliens at annual meetings of the American Society of International 
Law. 19 Given the dearth of international legal scholarship on the sub-
ject of immigration, it is not surprising that Congress, not academia, 
has initiated discussions about such options as the use of international 
financial institutions to extend grants and loans to developing st~tes 
experiencing serious burdens of mass migrations, as part of the 
developmental programs of those states. 20 
II. Two TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN SCHOLARSIDP 
A. An Assumption that a State May Deny Admission to Any 
and All Aliens: The Result of Undocumented Scholarship 
Although state practice, regional obligations, and universal norms 
disclose a practice of states to admit at least some aliens, it is still 
useful to examine the tendency of American legal scholars to assume 
that a state has a right to deny admission to any and all aliens. This 
tendency has been instrumental in shaping exclusionary provisions of 
municipal law and policy, in influencing interpretations of state duties 
toward refugees, and in delaying the emergence of human migration 
as a comprehensive topic on the international legal agenda. 21 Migrant 
labor would benefit from a multilateral convention to govern the ad-
mission of aliens by states. Short of that, it is essential for the world 
community, in accordance with emerging international law, to insist 
that states be accountable for denials of entry to aliens on the basis 
of an objective threat to the safety, security, welfare, or essential in-
stitutions of a state. The invisible college of international legal scholars 
ought to be more active in formulating and further developing such 
standards. 
Instead, one too often finds references, often without authority, to 
the notion that a state may legitimately exclude any or all aliens. 22 
A significant example involves the writings of a thoughtful specialist 
in human rights, Richard Lillich. Professor Lillich defends the prop-
osition that states possess an absolute right, in the absence of a treaty, 
to exclude aliens. In reviewing a book on immigration law, 23 Lillich 
19. 73 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 119 (1979); 76 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. _ (1982). 
20. See Nanda, supra note 4, at 472. 
21. For a rather polemical example of this effect, see Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigra-
tion Policy, 44 u. PITT. L. REV. 447, 447-48, 450-51, 458 (1983). 
22. See, e.g., C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (4th ed. 1965); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 372-73 (2d ed. 1966); W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 176 (1979); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO Puauc INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (4th. ed. 1981); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power 
to Exclude Aliens, 82 CoLUM. L. REv, 957, 968-69 (1982). 
23. Lillich, Book Review, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 670, 670-72 (1982) (reviewing G. GooDwIN-
GILL, supra note 9). 
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devotes a substantial portion of his comments to this theme - by no 
means unique among scholars - even though the book under review 
says that states claim only a "very wide margin of discretion" 24 in 
controlling the entry of aliens. 
A preponderant view, though not a rule, is that matters of alien 
entry belong within the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. Thus, 
the book reviewed by Professor Lillich realistically and correctly notes 
that because states seek freedom to control entry, it is "not easy to 
bring matters of entry and exclusion within the bounds of international 
law." 25 This is not to say, however, that it has not been done. In his 
commentary on the exclusionary statement, Lillich intriguingly inserts 
his own word, "customary," in brackets to qualify the general term 
"international law. " 26 He thereby questions the customary hospitality 
of states to some alien entry and suggests that it is jurisprudentially, 
rather than technically, difficult to bring international law to bear on 
issues of alien entry. Actually, the book under review generally 
demonstrates that international law governs the entry and exclusion 
of aliens, though it may be technically difficult to articulate 
comprehensively. · 
Authority for Professor Lillich's position is questionable. In his Hague 
Lectures, Professor Lillich put it very simply: "Under customary in-
ternational law, of c,ourse, a State is under no duty to admit aliens 
into its territory." 27 As authority, he refers only to a book published 
in 1915 by Professor Edwin Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens 
Abroad. 28 Although Borchard recognizes that there may be an ultimate 
power of exclusion, upon which a right is based to exclude undesirable 
aliens, he is careful to summarize opposing arguments and to attribute 
the exclusionist position to "[c]ourts in the United States and Great 
Britain. " 29 He also writes that an "ultimate power" to exclude aliens 
"would violate the spirit of international law." Thus, although the 
"grounds of exclusion are fixed by the public interests of each stafe," 
they are limited to "dangerous or undesirable" aliens. Moreover, an 
"arbitrary or unjust exclusion" gives rise to a political, though not 
a legal pecuniary claim. 30 Although he refers to the recognized inherent 
power of a state to exclude foreigners, Borchard nevertheless concludes 
that "the right of admission and sojourn on the part of unobjectionable 
aliens is almost universally recognized. Qualifications of the right, which 
24. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 94. 
25. Id. 
26. Lillich, supra note 23, at 671. 
27. Lillich, Duties of States regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, III RECUEIL DES CouRS 
1978, at 329, 339 (1980) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
28. E. BORCHARD, supra note 8. 
29. Id. at 45. 
30. Id. at 46-48. 
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are to be found in the possibilities of exclusion, expulsion and the fix-
ing of conditions of sojourn by the state, must in practice be based 
upon reasonable grounds. " 31 
The tendency to assume that states may deny entry to all aliens seems 
to be premised on a form of positivism which relies'" very heavily on 
treaties for the progressive development of migration law. 32 Such a 
bias, which often fails to respond to human needs and realities, is un-
necessary. Even the highly positivistic dictum in The Case of the S.S. 
"Lotus,, established only that "[r]estrictions upon the independence 
of states cannot ... be presumed," 33 not that they must take the form 
of positive pronouncements. Instead, it is important to take fuller ac-
count of the principles and evidence of custom that impose a duty 
upon states to share the burden of admitting aliens and thereby to 
contribute significantly to global solidarity. 
A Canadian specialist has observed that although states may exclude 
persons whose presence is inimical to the national interest, it is 
misleading and unproductive to suggest that states are free to do as 
they please; that is, to assume exclusive national competence to govern 
the admission of aliens. 34 American scholarship should take fuller ac-
count of the governing principles of international law, the spirit of 
existing state behavior and decisions, the expectations they elicit, and 
the extension of their coverage, by analogical reasoning, to issues of 
immigration. 
· B. The View that Treaties Define the International Law of 
Refugees: The Result of Overdocumented Scholarship 
The law of refugees presents other examples of the conservatism of 
United States legal scholarship in addressing issues of migrant move-
ment and entry. When, however, one moves from the general admis-
sion of aliens to the admission of specifically protected groups of aliens, 
particularly refugees, one moves from undocumented to overdocumented 
scholarship. 
Although the international law of refugees is moving steadily beyond 
the confines of the definition of a refugee found in Article 1 of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, 35 American legal scholarship is often wedded to that 
definition. 36 It is as if the law of refugees were a kind of gloss on 
31. Id. at 37. 
32. Lillich, supra note 23, at 671. 
33. The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 18 (Judgment of Sept. 7). 
34. Hucker, supra note 8, at 327, 329. 
35. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
36. See, e.g., Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee 
Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rsv. 9, 11 (1981); Le & Esser, The Vietnamese Refugee and 
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that definition. As a consequence, American jurists have had surpris-
ingly little to say about broader and more functional definitions of 
a refugee. These include the definitions of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees37 and such regional instruments as the Con-
vention on Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa of the Organization of African Unity. 38 By contrast to the con-
servatism of American scholarship, a recently published collection of 
essays39 evidences a greater inclination of European scholars to define 
the term "refugee" broadly. 40 Similarly, the 1982 Session on R~fugee 
U.S. Law, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 656, 666 (1981); Note, The Right of Asylum Under United 
States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 539 (1981); Note, Those Who Stand at the Door: 
Assessing Immigration Claims Based on Fear of Persecution, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 395, 396 
n.3 (1983); Comment, Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution Arising from a Prior 
Asylum Case, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 719, 721 (1981). But see Young, Between Sovereigns: A 
Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 339, 348 (1982). Most recent writings by United States scholars have 
centered on federal laws, with little attempt to consider definitions of "refugee" broader than 
that in the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), which reiterates the 
definition in Article I of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, see supra note 13 and accom-
panying text. The Le & Esser article, however, contains an interesting discussion of the capacity 
of United states law, under the Refugee Act of 1980, to take account of economic as well as 
political circumstances in interpreting the "persecution" requirement. 
37. Article 6 of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees generally 
reiterates the definition of a refugee found in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, see supra 
note 13 and accompanying text. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A 1775 (1950). 
Even so, the High Commissioner, in practice and by special delegation, assumes much broader 
jurisdiction over displaced persons within their country of nationality or origin, persons generally 
in need of the good offices of the High Commissioner, victims of natural disasters, and other 
persons who, for whatever reason, cannot avail themselves of the protection of their govern-
ment. In broad language, the United Nations General Assembly delegated the High Commis-
sioner in 1979 "to continue to promote . . . solutions to problems of refugees and displaced 
persons wherever they occur." G.A. Res. 34/60, para. 2, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 
173, U.N. Doc. 34/724 (1979). 
38. Article I of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa defines the term "refugee" to include not only persons covered by the 1951 Conven-
tion and its 1967 Protocol, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, but also any person com-· 
pelled to leave his home country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, 
or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality." OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
art. I, 1 2, done Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47 [hereinafter cited as OAU Convention]; 
see also Hyndman, Asylum and Non-Refoulement-Are These Obligations Owed to Refugees 
Under International Law?: 
The definition of "refugee" in the OAU Convention is wider than that in the 1951 
Convention. It is a pragmatic one related to the problems of the African continent. 
From the late 1950's onwards there have been, largely as a result of the presence or 
after effects of colonial regimes, troubles and wars resulting in massive displacements 
of peoples not always fitting easily into the 1951 Convention definition, even as ex-
tended by the 1967 Protocol, and the definition of the OAU Convention was drafted 
with these factors in mind. 
57 PHILIPPINE L.J. 43, 55 (1982). 
39. 3 MICH. Y.8. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES (1982). 
40. See, e.g., Grahl-Madsen, Refugees and Refugee Law in a World in Transition, 3 M1cH. 
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 65 (1982); Melander, 
Nordic Refugee Law and Policy, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT'LLEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROB-
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Law at the Institute of Public International Law and International Rela-
tions in Greece reflected an inclination of European and British Com-
monwealth scholars to define "refugee" under both the 1951 Conven-
tion 1967 Protocol and customary practices of states and organizations.•• 
Such practices include the admission of de facto refugees, 42 Class B 
refugees, 43 refugees in orbit, 44 victims of natural disasters, and other 
categories of refugees outside the scope of Article 1 of the 1951 Con-
vention 1967 Protocol. 45 
The emerging concept of temporary refuge has become a particularly 
prominent international concept. In an era of political and economic 
turbulence, temporary refuge has become a significant alternative to 
all-or-nothing responses to petitions for refuge. Mass migration has 
discouraged neighboring recipient states from granting permanent refuge, 
but has encouraged them to grant or consider granting temporary refuge 
until a permanent refuge in another country can be found. Moreover, 
one characteristic of contemporary mass migration is that, breaking 
with tradition, contemporary refugees often expect to return to their 
country of origin. Therefore, many refugees today consider their status 
only temporary and are therefore unwilling to integrate themselves ef-
fectively into the society and culture of recipient states. 
International law also recognizes the benefit of cooperation in eas-
ing short-term misallocations that may accompany large-scale migra-
tions. A study of the status of refugee law would be incomplete without 
considering the impact of this cooperation. The concept of temporary 
refuge has its roots in Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, which pro-
LEMS OF REFUGEES 229 (1982); Nobel, Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa, 3 MICH. Y.B. 
lNT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 255 (1982). 
41. Papers and proceedings of the Session may be found in XII THESAURUS AcROASIUM (1983). 
42. De facto refugees are refugees receiving status without qualifying as 1951 Convention/1%7 
Protocol refugees. The following are the most common categories of de facto refugees: 
(i) persons who have passed through the eligibility procedure in their country of residence 
and whose applications have been rejected or eliminated but who are unable or ... un-
willing to return to their country of origin (political dissidents); (ii) stateless persons 
not recognized as refugees who are unable or . . . unwilling to return to the country 
of their habitual residence; (iii) political offenders who are not extradited to their country 
of origin; (iv) persons who fulfil the other conditions of the definition of refugees 
in the 1951 convention as amended by the protocol but who still avail themselves of 
their national passports; ... (v) 'exiles' and/or 'crypto-refugees'[;] ... (vi) (p]ersons 
whose passpons have expired and who have been told that their passports will be ex-
tended or renewed only on the condition that they return to their country of origin 
but who are unwilling to do so[;] ... (vii) draft evaders ... draft resisters ... and 
deserters .... 
Hucker, supra note 8, at 335-36 (citing P. WEIS, 2 REPORT ON PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES AND Ex-
ILES IN EUROPE (Legal Report) 5 (1974)). 
43. Class B refugees a!e persons who, not being political refugees, are outside their country 
of origin because of political reasons or who upon return will face political sanctions. 
44. Refugees in orbit are persons who are shuttled from one country of refuge to another, 
with a consequent status approaching statelessness. 
45. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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vides that "[t]he Contracting States shall allow [unlawfully residing] 
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain 
admission into another country .... " 46 Article 32 provides that con-
tracting states may not expel a refugee in their territories except for 
reasons of national security or public order. Article 32 also provides 
that "[t]he Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable 
period within which to seek legal admission into another country. " 47 
Article 3(3) of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides that 
"[s)hould a State decide in any case that exception to the principle 
of [non-refoulement] would be justified, it shall consider the possibility 
of granting to the person concerned, under such conditions as it may 
deem appropriate, an opportunity, whether by way of provisional asylum 
or otherwise, of going to another State. " 48 In the concise words of 
an Australian writer: 
[A]lthough states are still resisting binding obligations to grant 
asylum in the sense of granting a right of permanent settle-
ment, state practice ... does indicate an acceptance of 
humanitarian obligations - an acceptance that refugees who 
arrive at foreign borders seeking admission should not be re-
jected, whether such rejection would mean a return across the 
border to the country fled, or the sending of the refugees upon 
a further dangerous journey to seek admission at another fron-
tier, and that they should be given temporary refuge at least, 
provided that this is placed within a wider context of interna-
tional cooperation. As well, the necessity for this assumption 
of responsibility at an international level seems to be gaining 
increasing acceptance. 49 
Principles of international cooperation, solidarity, and burden shar-
ing have their roots in the preamble to the 1951 Convention, which 
reads as follows: "Considering that the grant of asylum may place 
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solu-
tion of [the] problem . . . cannot be achieved without international 
cooperation .... " 50 In order to give effect to these observations, Arti-
cle 2(2) of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides that 
"[w]here a State finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant 
46. Convention, supra note 13, at art. 31. 
47. Id. at art. 32. 
48. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16 at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967). 
49. Hyndman, supra note 38, at 77; see also Conclusions on International Protection Adopted 
by the Executive Committee, in Report of the 28th Session of the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add.l, at 12-16 (1977). 
50. Convention, supra note 13, at preamble. 
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asylum, States individually or jointly or through the United Nations 
shall consider, in a spirit of international solidarity, appropriate measures 
to lighten the burden on that State."' 1 The December 1981 Report _of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "[c]alls upon the 
international community to share the burden of assisting refugees and 
displaced persons the world over, taking into account the economic 
and demographic absorptive capacity of the countries concerned . . . . '' 52 
On the regional level, a treaty among members of the Organization 
of African Unity entitled the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa requires that all contracting states 
cooperate "in the spirit of African solidarity" 53 with any others ex-
periencing a burden as a recipient state. The steady development of 
these principles testifies to the willingness of the international com-
munity to extend the definition of a refugee beyond Article 1 of the 
1951 Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol. Even though states 
may have been reluctant to accept obligations of temporary refuge and 
international cooperation explicitly as opinio Juris, the general prac-
tice "does indicate that these concepts are being accepted in fact." 54 
In sum, the progressive development of refugee law seems to tran-
scend the narrow scope of current treaty law. A new body of customary 
law and general principles on the admission of refugees is emerging 
from several sources. These sources include norm-creating provisions 
of the treaty definition of a refugee as far as it goes, United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions, norms to which the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees adheres, the recommendations of interna-
tional conferences, state practice, emergent concepts such as that of 
temporary refuge, and such general principles as those of international 
cooperation, solidarity, and burden sharing." These developments merit 
greater attention by American legal scholars. 
Ill. A TENTATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE Two TENDENCIES 
A tentative explanation for these two significant tendencies of 
American legal scholarship may be a jurisprudential bias in favor of 
common law precedent and black letter pronouncements. For exam-
ple, the notion that a state has a right to exclude any and all aliens 
rests "almost exclusively"'6 on interpretations and misinterpretations 
of antiquated common law precedents. These precedents are principally 
51. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967). 
52. 36 U.N. GAOR Annex 725 (agenda item 83) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/36/725 (1981). 
53. OAU Convention, supra note 38, art. 11(4). Sub-paragraph five defines the status of 
a temporary refugee. 
54. Hyndman, supra note 38, at 73, 77. 
55. Id. at 67. 
56. M. KONVJTZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 18 n.53 (1946). 
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The Chinese Exclusion Case" and Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, 58 
both of which have racist underpinnings and are nearly a century old. 
Little attention is paid to general principles of interdependence, coopera-
tion, and good faith, nor to the state practice of hospitality, historically 
and geographically, toward aliens seeking entry. 
The effect of positivism on American scholarship has been summa-
rized as follows: 
Everyone likes categories, and legal philosophers like them very 
much. So we spend a good deal of time, not all of it profitably, 
labeling ourselves and the theories of law we defend. One label, 
however, is particularly dreaded: no one wants to be called a 
natural lawyer. Natural law insists that what the law is depends 
in some way on what the law should be. This seems metaphysical 
or at least vaguely religious. In any case it seems plainly wrong. 
If some theory of law is shown to be a natural law theory, 
therefore, people can be excused if they do not attend to it 
much further. 59 
Even worse, perhaps, than admitting a weakness for natural law is 
questioning positivistic assumptions about the conclusiveness of treaties 
in defining international law. Nevertheless, the penchant of positivists 
to regard the reality of natural rights as nothing more than spooky, 
pious-sounding abstraction is misplaced. It is simply incorrect to argue 
"that human rights are rights legally only because they have been granted 
by positive law" and misleading to assert that natural law "is not law."60 
As Marcus Aurelius, John Locke, Eleanor Roosevelt, Mahatma Gan-
dhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. would surely remind us, human rights 
are derived from principles of natural law. 61 Positive law, on the other 
hand, serves the vital function of articulating and formalizing consen-
sus on legal duties based upon these natural rights. 62 Thus, natural 
law and positive law have a symbiotic relationship. They are mutually 
necessary in establishing human rights; it is difficult to have one without 
the other. 
57. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
58. [1891) A.C. 272. 
59. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). 
60. Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 319 (1949). 
61. M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 1-17 (1973); Castberg, Natural law and human 
rights; An idea-historical survey, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-24 (A. 
Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968); Tanaka, Some Observations on Peace, Law, and Human Rights, 
in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 242, 250 (W. Friedmann, L. Henkin & 0. 
Lissitzyn eds. 1972). 
62. M. MANELI, JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1981). 
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IV. AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
A tentative explanation for the conservatism of American scholar-
ship on migration law may therefore be its positivistic preoccupation 
with explicitly formulated and formalized prescriptions. Instead, legal 
scholars ought to broaden, not simply adapt themselves to, rigid 
analytical frameworks such as that of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and 1967 Protocol. In addressing issues associated with the natural process 
of human migration, scholars should examine all relevant values, norms, 
and practices in the light of natural rights theory, most especially the 
basic human need of migration. The presumptions need to be reversed. 
A leading British scholar has observed that 
[t]here are some grounds for thinking of the right to freedom 
of movement as the first and most fundamental of man's liber-
ties .... One of the things that is meant by saying that men 
have a natural right to freedom of movement is to assert that 
the desire to move is a natural, universal, and reasonable one; 
and hence that it is not so much a man's desire to move that 
needs to be justified as any attempt to frustrate the satisfac-
tion of that desire. 63 
A failure to take account of the dynamics of human aspirations to 
migrate or a preoccupation with positive pronouncements is irrespon-
sible. One is reminded of President Millard Fillmore's chillingly stoic 
comment about the abolition of slavery: "God knows that I detest 
Slavery, but it is an existing evil, for which we are not responsible, 
and we must endure it, and give it such protection as is guaranteed 
by the Constitution, till we can get rid of it without destroying the 
last hope of free government in the world. " 64 Today, a xenophobic 
climate inhibits the path of justice for migrants. We are reminded that 
in a world in which the principle of nationality is the founda-
tion of domestic and of international legitimacy, large numbers 
of refugees tend to dilute the national community which they 
join, and to be resented as alien intruders. But they deserve 
a chance to become part of this community. What is ethically 
imperative is an international, or failing that, a national 
guarantee not just of assistance but of settlement and integra-
tion in other countries. 65 
63. CRANSTON, supra note 61, at 31 (emphasis added). 
64. BUFFALO HISTORICAL SocIETY, I MILLARD FILLMORE PAPERS 335 (F. Severance ed. 1970). 
65. S. HOFFMANN, supra note 10, at 225. 
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International legal scholarship has the difficult task of helping to 
reconcile certain ideals of human aspiration with popular and sovereign 
concerns that a state's reputation for hospitality to aliens may encourage 
an unmanageable influx of them. 66 International institutions, including 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and 
the International Law Commission, off er an appropriate initial 
framework for systematically clarifying and articulating the details of 
international immigration law. 67 Comparative legal analysis also helps 
disclose emergent custom. 
A recent decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court offers a cogent 
comparative perspective. In Chandra v. Minister of Immigration, 68 an 
alien from Fiji applied for review of an administrative order denying 
him permanent residence in New Zealand and ordering him to leave 
within fourteen days. The applicant for review sought (I) a review of 
the decision of the Minister of Immigration ref using to grant the ap-
plication for permanent residence in New Zealand; (2) an order direct-
ing the Minister to grant the applicant permanent residence in New 
Zealand; and (3) such other orders as might appear just. 69 The Minister 
of Immigration filed a motion for an order striking out the applica-
tion for review. In dismissing the Minister's motion, the New Zealand 
Supreme Court observed as follows: 
Even if the law is that there is now no valid distinction be-
tween the duty to act fairly and the duty to . act in accordance 
with the rules of natural justice, then there is a duty on the 
Minister to act in accordance with the rules of natural justice 
as that expression has been extended and as it is understood 
by recent decisions to which reference has been made in this 
judgment. 10 
In applying this formula, the Supreme Court specifically rejected ''the 
somewhat xenophobic view"' of Lord Denning in Schmidt v. Secretary 
of State for Home Affairs: "l have always held the view that at com-
mon law no alien has any right to enter this country except by leave 
of the Crown: and the Crown can refuse leave without giving any 
66. See Martin, Large-Scale Migrations of Asylum Seekers, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 598,609 (1982). 
Martin's article also provides an excellent commentary on recent developments in refugee law. 
67. See, e.g., the guidelines on refugee admissions in OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
CoMMIS.SIONER FOR REfuGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRrTinuA FOR DETERMINING REfuGEE 
STATUS (1979). 
68. (1978) 2 N.Z.L.R. 559. 
69. Id. at 560-61. 
70. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
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reason. " 11 Abandoning the "xenophobic" view of Lord Denning, the 
Court recognized ''that the old concept of the Royal prerogative to 
keep foreigners at bay has been superseded by the qiodern transporta-
tion and the mass population movements of the twentieth century." 12 
CONCLUSION 
The global community needs a comprehensive international law of 
migration. So far, the contributions of American legal scholars to the 
development of a new legal regime have been modest. If international 
lawyers are to perform a more prominent role, they will need to be 
both visionary and realistic. They must help make the law explicit; 
hard law, including international agreements, is indispensable. Never-
theless, the hard law can only develop in response to the natural ex-
igencies of migration. These exigencies contradict two fundamental 
tendencies of American legal scholarship: to assume that a state may 
deny entry to all aliens and to view the definition of a refugee largely 
within the narrow framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It is time for scholars and 
decision makers to overcome these tendencies and to develop and codify 
international agreements which are uninhibited by them. 
11. Id. at 568. 
72. Id. 

